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The revolt of the 
bankers in the 
international 
economy: a world 
without a monetary 
system * 
Carlos Massad * 
This article gives a brief overview of the 
post-war international monetary system 
and its main characteristics, with special 
emphasis on the aspects which subsequen-
tly created difficulties. It shows how the 
system developed and identifies the 
events which led to the international 
monetary crisis at the beginning of the 
1970s. It describes the exchange arrange-
ments which arose as a consequence of 
the crisis and analyses the conditions in 
which such arrangements can be effective, 
the developing countries' possibilities of 
using them, and the effects on those 
countries and on the demand for 
international liquidity by the public and 
private sectors. With regard to this latter 
aspect, it stresses the increase in the 
private sector's intervention role in the 
exchange markets and the influence of 
this increase on the international genera-
tion and transmission of disequilibria. It 
then goes on to the attempts to reform 
the monetary system and the amend-
ments to the Articles of Agreement of the 
International Monetary Fund and their 
effects on the developing countries. 
Finally, it offers some commentaries 
on the influence of the present inter-
national economic situation on the future 
development of the monetary system, 
contrasting the declared objectives with 
the present trends. 
*UNDP expert on monetary and financial 
systems seconded to the International Trade 
and Development Division, CEPAL. 
Introduction 
The last ten years have witnessed 
profound and rapid changes in the field 
of international financial relations, 
extending from the attempt to regulate 
the growth of international liquidity in 
the second half of the 1960s to the 
official acceptance of freedom in 
exchange matters at the beginning of the 
second half of the 1970s. An important 
implication of these changes is that they 
have shifted the main responsibility as 
regards exchange regulation. 
Thus, the system in force since the 
end of the Second World War placed the 
main responsibility for the functioning 
of the system in the hands of the 
monetary authorities, whereas in the 
present situation it is the private sector 
market and bodies, particularly the 
banks and the transnational enterprises, 
which play an accepted and decisive role 
in the short-term management of exchange 
rates and the accumulation and disposal 
of international means of payment. 
1. 
The Bretton Woods system 
The earliest sporadic efforts to organize 
some form of international monetary 
system to replace the gold standard date 
from the period of monetary disorder of 
the 1930s, but the first systematic 
proposals were made only in 1942, in 
government circles of the United King-
dom and the United States. 
These proposals were aimed at 
finding a solution for the monetary 
problems which were expected after the 
Second World War. The studies and 
proposals were headed by Harry 
'The theme of this article was presented at the 
CEPAL academic seminar of 4 May 1976. The author 
wishes to acknowledge the comments received, parti-
cularly those of Raúl Prebisch and Andrés Bianchi. 
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D. White of the Department of the 
Treasury of the United States and by 
John M. Keynes in England. 
Less than three years had passed since 
the original proposal when the Internatio-
nal Monetary and Financial Conference of 
the United Nations and their associates, 
meeting at Bretton Woods, New Hampshi-
re, in the United States, gave its approval 
to the new system. This was reflected in 
the Articles of Agreement of the new 
International Monetary Fund, which were 
adopted at that conference on 22 July 
1944, came into force on 27 December 
1945, and continued without changes for 
almost 25 years.2 
(a) The problems to be solved 
This international agreement pursued 
two main objectives: the correction of 
balance-of-payments problems and the 
creation and regulation of international 
liquidity. 
As regards the first point, the 
agreement laid down that a country 
could only vary the relationship of its 
currency with gold, i.e., its "parity", 
when there were fundamental imbalan-
ces which could not be solved by any 
other means, and it placed emphasis on 
monetary and fiscal policies. It was 
expected that, except in extreme cases, 
these would be successful in adjusting 
the balance of payments without any 
need to modify parity. In order to 
ensure stable parity, the countries 
undertook to maintain their currencies 
within maximum limits of variation of 
2
 An excellent description of the various 
proposals made, the debates which took place 
and the negotiations which led to the Bretton 
Woods agreement may be found in Y. Keith 
Horsefield, The International Monetary Fund 
1945-1965, International Monetary Fund, 
Washington, D.C., 1969. 
one per cent above or below parity and 
to intervene in the market to maintain 
those limits. Thus, through this relation-
ship with gold, a relationship of the various 
currencies among themselves was also 
established: the system of exchange rates. 
Since the intervention was to be 
carried out with United States dollars, 
that country lost its freedom to 
determine its own exchange rate. Indeed, 
the dollar exchange rate was simply the 
result of the determination by the rest of 
the member countries of the system of 
their own exchange rates with respect to 
the dollar. If the United States had tried 
to establish a different exchange rate, this 
would have led to a situation of incompa-
tibility of policies, so that country had to 
refrain from intervening in the market. It 
was, however, agreed to convert into gold, 
at the official price of 35 dollars per troy 
ounce of fine gold, all dollars presented 
for conversion by the monetary authori-
ties of the member countries. 
Thus, the dollar was the currency of 
intervention and current use in inter-
national payments, the exchange rates of 
the various currencies were established in 
relation to the dollar, and the dollar, in 
turn, anchored the system to gold. It was 
expected that the International Mone-
tary Fund would recommend adjustment 
measures both for countries with deficits 
and those with surpluses in their 
international payments, and a system of 
medium-terms loans was set up for the 
countries which took adjustment measu-
res, with the aim of covering the period 
needed until those measures took effect. 
As regards the creation of liquidity, 
the Articles of Agreement of the 
International Monetary Fund provided 
that this should be regulated through 
"uniform changes in par values", which 
are no other but changes in the price of 
gold, expressed in all currencies in the 
same proportion. This is the same thing 
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as a change in the price of gold in all 
currencies: more currency units for the 
same quantity of gold, thus increasing 
international liquidity, although natu-
rally only in terms of currencies and not 
of gold. 
A second means of modifying 
international liquidity consisted of the 
possible accumulation of more gold in 
the vaults of the Central Banks. Thus, 
the creation of international liquidity 
was linked to the total existing reserves 
of gold, the annual production of that 
metal, and its price in terms of currency 
units. 
(b) The system in practice 
The economic conditions of the 
countries at the end of the Second World 
War were such that the dollar became 
the international means of payment and 
the most sought-after currency for 
accumulation. On the one hand the 
European countries needed to build up 
their reserves, while on the other, the 
rapid expansion of world trade after the 
war generated a growing need for means 
of payment. In order to accumulate 
these, the European countries maintained 
persistent surpluses on their inter-
national payments, which was only 
possible thanks to the persistent deficits 
of the United States, financed through 
the increase in the United States' 
short-term external liabilities. 
The foregoing leads us up to one of 
the great problems raised by the scheme 
devised at Bretton Woods: the lack of 
incentives for making adjustments in 
countries with persistent surpluses or 
countries able to finance their deficits 
with their own currency which was 
accumulating abroad. Neither of these 
types of countries needed to have 
recourse to IMF financing, and they 
were therefore not subject to its 
discipline,3 which eventually applied in 
practice mainly to the countries with 
international payments deficits and 
without reserve currency. 
Furthermore, the international 
liquidity requirements were being satis-
fied through the accumulation of dollars 
by the countries with surpluses, at the 
cost of transferring real resources to the 
country issuing the reserve currency. 
The system therefore contained 
three main shortcomings: a shortcoming 
as regards the stimuli for making 
adjustments, which caused the burden of 
these adjustments to fall on the 
countries which had deficits and no 
reserve currency; a shortcoming as 
regards the obligation to intervene in 
currency markets which meant that the 
United States was exempted from this 
requirement in return for guaranteeing 
convertibility into gold, and a short-
coming as regards the generation of 
liquidity, the cost of which had to be 
paid by the rest of the world to the 
issuing country. 
This last shortcoming calls for a 
special explanation. When a country 
accumulates means of payment from 
abroad it does so by refraining from 
using those means of payment to obtain 
real resources from other countries. For 
its part, the country which supplies the 
foreign currency thus accumulated does 
so in exchange for a good or service from 
the country receiving the currency. 
Thus, a country which finances its 
deficits with its own currency is really 
changing that currency for goods and 
services abroad. The country which 
accumulates such currency is supplying 
Except, in the case of the former, for the 
possibility that their currency might be 
declared a "scarce currency". This punishment 
was never applied, however. 
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goods and services in exchange for it, so 
that there is a net flow of real resources 
from the country which accumulates 
reserves towards the country which 
finances its deficits. The country 
issuing the currency is receiving 
seigniorage from those accumulating it. 
Some of the shortcomings mentio-
ned above were solved more adequately 
in the plan put forward by Keynes 
during the discussion on monetary 
reform held in the last years of the 
Second World War. This plan provided 
for the establishment of a clearing house 
which would act as a kind of central 
bank of the central banks and keep 
accounts of international transactions, 
just as a central bank keeps accounts of 
the transactions between commercial 
banks. The plan provided for interest to 
be collected both on negative and 
positive balances with the system, thus 
creating an incentive for adjustments 
not only by the debtor countries but 
also by the creditor countries. It limited 
both the positive and the negative 
balances to a certain maximum and 
suggested the creation by multilateral 
decision of an international currency, 
"bancor", to provide the necessary 
international liquidity. It laid down 
certain conditions under which debtor 
countries had to devalue their currencies 
or creditor countries had to revalue 
theirs, and it permitted much greater 
exchange flexibility than the agreement 
adopted at Bretton Woods, which was 
inspired by the ideas of Harry D. White. 
The Keynes plan also proposed the 
creation of an international investment 
organization to which automatic contribu-
tions would be made by countries with 
balance-of-payments surpluses, an 
organization responsible for regulating 
the cyclic variations in the prices of 
primary commodities, and an inter-
national economic organization for 
consultation and discussion on economic 
policy in the world. 
Both plans -that of White and that 
of Keynes— assigned great importance to 
the action of the authorities in the 
functioning of the monetary system. 
This was clear both from the multilateral 
body which was supposed to be set up 
and from the policies whose application 
by governments was supposed to make 
exchange fluctuations unnecessary or at 
least minimal. 
2. 
The development and crisis of the 
international monetary system 
After the end of the Second World War, 
the economies of Europe and Japan 
began to recover from the effects of the 
world conflict, to grow more rapidly 
than the United States economy, and to 
increase their productivity at a rapid 
rate. International trade expanded, and 
the demands on official reserves 
increased. Private holdings of inter-
national liquidity were of no importance 
whatever: the rigidity of exchange rates 
and the decreasing importance of 
exchange restrictions enabled the private 
sector to obtain the foreign exchange it 
needed from the monetary authorities at 
a given price. Since there was no serious 
uncertainty about exchange rates and 
the money markets were relatively 
limited, there were no abrupt short-term 
international movements of capital. 
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(a) The development of the system 
A situation thus took shape in which 
the European countries and Japan 
registered continual balan ce-of-payments 
surpluses and thus accumulated the 
reserves which they needed. The United 
States balance of payments, for its part, 
registered a persistent deficit, financed 
by an increase in its external liabilities 
matching the accumulation of dollars by 
the countries which had a surplus. 
Although the United States was not 
obliged to intervene in the markets to 
maintain the parity of the dollar, the 
system did provide for the convertibility 
into gold by the United States monetary 
authorities, on demand, of the dollar 
balances of official currency holders. It 
was assumed that this convertibility 
would induce the United States to apply 
adjustment measures to its balance of 
payments in view of the sustained 
deficits and the consequent accumula-
tion of dollars abroad. These incentives 
proved ineffective, however, in view of 
the vigorous world demand for dollars 
with which to build up reserves. Already 
at the beginning of the 1960s official 
holdings of dollars abroad exceeded the 
gold reserves of the United States, and by 
the end of 1970 they came to 25 billion 
dollars4 whereas in the same year the 
United States' holdings of gold amoun-
ted to only 13.8 billions dollars.5 
As foreseen by Robert Triffin,* by 
the middle of the 1950s the massive 
4
 Not counting official holdings of Euro-
dollars. If these are taken into account, the 
figure rises to 34.2 billion dollars. See IMF, 
Annual Report, 1975, p. 39. 
5
 Including 2.8 billion dollars in Special 
Drawing Rights and IMF loans. 
6
 Robert Triffin, Europe and the Money 
Muddle, New Haven, Yale University Press, 
1957: see especially pp. 296-299. 
accumulation of dollars outside the 
United States created a risk of inconver-
tibility, since the monetary authorities 
of that country would not have been 
able to convert most of the official 
foreign holdings of dollars if these had 
been presented for that purpose. 
(b) The symptoms of the crisis 
The growing lack of confidence in 
the system led to the appearance of 
various crisis symptoms. When doubts 
arose regarding the capacity (or the 
willingness) of the United States to 
convert into gold the dollars accumula-
ted abroad by official holders, this 
caused an unstable situation in which 
rumours were responsible for the move-
ments of the market. As far back as 
1960 the price of gold on the private 
market rose above 40 dollars per ounce, 
and this led Germany, Belgium, the 
United States, France, the Netherlands, 
Italy, the United Kingdom and Switzer-
land to enter into an agreement to pool 
their gold reserves in order to keep the 
market price at not more than 35.20 
dollars per ounce. In December 1967 the 
United States lost almost a billion dollars 
-some 750 tons of fine gold at the 
official price of 35 dollars per ounce— 
when there was a wave of conversion of 
dollars into gold because of the fear that 
the United States exchange policy was 
likely to change. The losses continued in 
the early months of 1968, and in March 
the countries which had pooled their 
reserves declared that they would no 
longer support the price of gold on the 
free market and that the official price 
would be maintained only for transac-
tions between central banks.7 
7France left the group at the end of 1967. 
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The heavy conversions of dollars 
into gold in 1967, together with the 
growing accumulation of dollars abroad 
in contrast with the limited gold reserves 
of the United States, gave rise in the late 
1960s to the generalized impression that 
the latter country would be obliged to 
apply adjustment measures to its econo-
my in order to eliminate its balance-of-
payments deficit. Such measures would 
bring about the closing down of the 
main source of new international liqui-
dity, with the consequent danger that 
there would be a shortage of liquidity 
and a generalized tendency towards 
restrictions on foreign trade. In view of 
this prospect, the countries began to 
interest themselves in the possible 
creation of a substitute for the dollar as 
a means of international liquidity, the 
idea being to determine the value of that 
substitute by international agreement on 
the basis of some reasonable estimate of 
world liquidity requirements. 
This is how Special Drawing Rights, 
which were linked to gold at the same 
parity as the dollar and which it was 
hoped would become the main form of 
international reserve assets, were born. 
Special Drawing Rights correspond to 
accounting entries between the IMF and 
the participating countries, and each 
country is assigned a certain amount of 
these rights, which it can use to obtain 
convertible currency. Special Drawing 
Rights have no physical existence and can 
only be held and used by institutions 
which carry out the functions of central 
banks. The amendment to the Articles of 
Agreement of the International Mone-
tary Fund which set up Special Drawing 
Rights (SDRs) was adopted on 31 May 
1968 and, came into force on 28 July 
1969. This was the first amendment to 
the Articles of Agreement of the 
Monetary Fund since these came into 
force at the end of 1945, almost 25 
years before. 
The prophecies which had led to the 
establishment of Special Drawing Rights 
were not fulfilled. Not only did the 
United States balance-of-payments defi-
cits continue, but there was also a big 
increase in the holdings of dollars and 
other currencies outside the issuing 
countries, thus giving a strong impulse to 
the Eurocurrency market. 
Towards 1958 the Socialist 
countries, and especially the Soviet 
Union, began to deposit dollars in 
European banks to avoid possible action 
against them if they deposited the 
money in the United States, and these 
deposits gave rise to credits in the same 
currency. A little earlier the United 
Kingdom had introduced restrictions on 
the pound sterling for international trade 
purposes because of a heavy external 
deficit. These two facts gave rise to 
the Eurodollar market, made up of 
deposits in dollars outside the United 
States, both by central banks and govern-
ments and by commercial banks and 
other private bodies. Furthermore, as 
the international trade position of 
currencies other than the dollar was 
strengthened, deposits and credits in 
these currencies also began to be made 
outside their country of origin, thus 
diversifying and expanding the Euro-
currency market. These deposits and 
credits are not subject to the regulations 
and restrictions of the countries issuing 
the respective currencies, nor are they 
generally subject to regulation in the 
recipient country, so the Eurocurrency 
market is the freest and least regulated 
money market in the world. 
The increase in the private holdings 
of foreign currencies, their diversifica-
tion and the growing volume of official 
holdings brought still further instability 
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into the system. As soon as rumours of 
some change in the parity of a particular 
currency arose, this led to strong 
destabilizing movements of capital. 
Because of their magnitude, the mone-
tary effects of such movements on the 
countries whose currencies were involved 
were impossible to compensate, even 
through non-traditional measures such as 
negative interest rates on deposits by 
aliens. Not even direct controls were 
sufficient to stop the short-term capital 
movements, since these were able to 
assume forms which were difficult or 
impossible to control, such as deferred 
or advance payments for imports and 
exports. By means such as those 
indicated, the capital movements some-
times took place through current 
transactions, which, according to the 
Bretton Woods agreement, could not or 
rather should not be regulated through 
direct controls. 
(c) Crisis and confusion 
As the accumulation of dollars 
in official and private circles outside 
the United States continued, this in 
turn generated lack of confidence in 
the convertibility of the dollar into gold 
and gave rise to strongly destabilizing 
capital movements. In these circum-
stances, on 15 August 1971 the United 
States Government officially suspended 
the convertibility of the dollar into gold, 
thus breaking the very basis of the 
monetary system set up at Bretton 
. Woods. This date marks the final crisis of 
this system. 
After this measure by the United 
States, there was great confusion in the 
markets and repeated attempts to find a 
new set of parities capable of being 
maintained. At the end of 1971, at a 
meeting held in the Smithsonian Insti-
tute, Washington, D.C., the highest 
financial authorities of 11 industrial 
countries8 agreed to vary the exchange 
rates of their currencies by devaluing 
some of them (mainly the dollar) and 
revaluing others, such as the Japanese 
yen and the German mark. In effect, the 
devaluation of the dollar represented an 
increase in the official price of gold from 
35 to 38 dollars per ounce. At the same 
time, with the aim of trying to cushion 
short-term capital movements, it was 
decided to expand the permissible 
margin of fluctuation of the currencies 
each side of parity from 1 per cent to 
2.25 per cent When it ratified these 
agreements,9 the IMF created a new 
concept, that of "central exchange 
rates". These, unlike the former "pari-
ties", do not necessarily assume a 
relationship with gold, but rather with 
another currency or with Special 
Drawing Rights. 
The aim of the expansion of the 
permissible margins of fluctuation 
around parity or around the central rates 
was to establish an instrument which 
would cushion, through the functioning 
of the market forces, the short-term 
capital movements recorded in the 
recent past. It was hoped that, by 
increasing from 2 per cent to 4.5 per 
cent the width of the band within which 
the various currencies fluctuate without 
it being necessary for official interven-
tion to take place to maintain the 
exchange rate, this would considerably 
weaken the incentive for short-term 
capital movements. 
"West Germany, Belgium, Canada, the 
United States, France, Italy, Japan, the 
Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Sweden and 
Switzerland. 
9
 The Smithsonian agreements are the first 
in which it was agreed to make generalized 
changes in exchange rates. 
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The new band was not sufficient to 
achieve its purpose either, however, and 
scarcely six months after the Smith-
sonian Agreement this had been comple-
tely smashed by events, while a very 
wide variety of exchange systems had 
sprung up in the various countries. For 
The independent floating of the main 
currencies discourages economic integra-
tion to some extent, since it changes the 
degree of protection agreed in advance 
for each of the economies which form 
part of an integration scheme with 
regard to the others. Such changes tend 
to create friction between the countries 
and to weaken agreements which often 
reflect a delicate balance of interests. 
Because of their awareness of this 
situation, and with the • object of 
continuing to advance towards their aims 
of economic integration, a group of 
European countries, basically those of 
the European Economic Community, 
tried to find ways of limiting the relative 
fluctuations between their currencies 
and agreed to set up a system under 
which they undertook not to allow the 
exchange rates to diverge from each 
other by more than 2.25 per cent with 
respect to the central parities or 
exchange rates agreed upon. Conse-
quently, the group of currencies was to 
move more or less in unison within 
maximum margins of fluctuation equal 
to half the total margin of 4.50 per cent 
permitted by the Smithsonian Agree-
ment. Thus arose the "snake", made up 
of the group of European currencies 
which fluctuated less than the rest. The 
maximum margin of fluctuation of 4.50 
reasons which will be analysed later, the 
majority of the developing countries had 
no alternative but to link their currencies 
to that of some industrial country with 
which they had important trade and 
capital transaction links. 
per cent was called the "tunnel", so that 
a monetary system was set up for the 
major countries which consisted of a 
"snake in a tunnel". 
In practice, the maximum margin of 
4.50 per cent of fluctuation soon lost its 
validity, while some of the members of 
the "snake" abandoned and rejoined it 
according to circumstances.10 
Some countries such as Canada, the 
United States, Italy, Japan and the United 
Kingdom decided to allow their currencies 
to float independently. This did not 
mean that their authorities gave up 
intervening in the market, but simply 
that they ceased to stick to any fixed or 
previously revealed rules in this respect. 
Other countries fixed their exchange 
rates with respect to a set of currencies 
or to Special Drawing Rights and 
10
 West Germany, Belgium, France, 
Luxemburg and the Netherlands were the 
original members of this group, the formation 
of which was announced on 12 March 1972. On 
16 March it was joined by Sweden, on 24 April 
by Italy, and on 1 May by the United Kingdom, 
Ireland and Denmark. These latter countries 
withdrew from the agreement on 23 June 1972, 
but Denmark re-entered it on 10 October. Italy 
left the group in February 1973. Finally, 
France left the group temporarily in January 
1974, rejoined it in the last quarter of 1975, 
and left it once again at the end of the first 
quarter of 1976. 
3. 
The "snake", the "tunnel" and floating 
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intervened in the market in order to 
maintain that rate, while others linked 
their currency to that of some other 
country. This latter category includes 
most of the developing countries. 
Thus, the system of parities esta-
blished at Bretton Woods, which had 
operated for 25 years, was replaced by a 
If small exchange rate changes are 
sufficient to bring about marked correc-
tive movements in the balance of 
payments, then countries would be well 
advised to allow their currencies to float 
and the balance of international pay-
ments would be facilitated by only slight 
exchange rate modifications. In contrast, 
if severe exchange rate fluctuations are 
required in order to bring about a given 
corrective movement in the balance of 
payments, the countries probably would 
not be willing to allow their currencies 
to float freely or even with some degree 
of intervention. At the same time, while 
the existence of exchange markets 
—particularly for future transactions-
enables exporters and importers to cover 
themselves against the risk of exchange 
rate changes, if such markets do not 
exist or if their scale is very limited this 
makes such coverage more difficult. 
Thus, a country where the existence of 
well-developed money markets is accom-
panied by a relatively high elasticity of 
response of the balance of payments to 
exchange rate movements will prefer the 
system of floating to other possible 
systems, whereas if such markets do not 
exist and there is poor elasticity of 
variety of systems which reflected the 
diversity of interests and economic 
situations of the countries. For some of 
them, exchange rate floating has proved 
a relatively efficient solution, with 
relatively small alterations in exchange 
rates proving sufficient to bring about 
corrective movements, but for others 
floating may involve a high economic 
and social cost. 
adjustment to exchange rate movements 
this will act as a considerable deterrent 
to floating. 
The responsiveness of the balance of 
payments to exchange rate movements 
will depend both on the price elasticities 
of the demand for imports and the 
supply of exports and on the probable 
magnitude of the changes in the 
conditions being faced by the country. 
This probable magnitude will influence 
the capital movements. 
The smaller the proportion of 
imported products in the total and the 
more diversified are both imports and 
national production, the greater will be 
the price elasticity of the demand for 
imports. Thus, for example, a country 
which imports only a small proportion 
of the total domestic supply of parti-
cular products will find that the 
elasticity of demand for imports goes up 
in inverse proportion to the share of 
total demand, at each price, which is 
imported. 
Furthermore, a country with diversi-
fied production which generally exports 
domestic production surpluses that are 
relatively small compared with total 
production will find that small exchange 
4. 
To float or not to float 
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rate movements will suffice to alter the 
price relationship between exported 
products and those consumed in the 
country; such alteration will be suffi-
cient to cause the changes in demand 
thus generated to absorb an appreciable 
proportion of the exportable product or 
to increase considerably the balance 
available for export. 
If these circumstances are present at 
the same time, then small variations in 
the exchange rate will produce substan-
tial movements towards the adjustment 
of the balance-of-payments current 
account and, consequently, the probabi-
lity that there will be very sharp changes 
in the exchange rate is only small. 
Moreover, if it is unlikely that the 
external or internal conditions faced by 
a country will change very substantially, 
then this set of circumstances will mean 
that the changes to be expected in the 
exchange rate will only be small. This 
will have an influence on capital 
movements, since limited movements in 
the domestic interest rates with respect 
to the external rates will be sufficient to 
compensate for possible gains through 
speculative transactions in connexion 
with exchange rate changes.11 
Generally speaking, these conditions 
exist more markedly in the United States 
nLet us assume, for example, that a 3 per 
cent devaluation in a country's currency is 
expected in the year. It will be sufficient for 
domestic interest rates to rise 3 per cent 
compared with external rates in order to 
eliminate any incentive to take capital out of 
the country. Similarly, however, if the expected 
devaluation is 15 per cent, then the domestic 
interest rates must rise by at least that figure 
with respect to external rates in order to 
achieve the same purpose. The necessary 
movements in interest rates would have to be 
even bigger if the devaluation was expected at a 
certain moment in time instead of taking place 
over a whole period. 
than in any of the countries of the 
European Economic Community taken 
separately. The European integration 
efforts, however, together with the joint 
float of the European countries* curren-
cies, mean that the comparison should 
not be with each country, but with the 
whole group of countries. Viewed in this 
way, the countries of the European 
Economic Community show conditions 
very similar to those of the United 
States, so that the system of floating 
seems suitable for both. 
For most of the developing coun-
tries, in constrast, the situation is exactly 
the opposite. The price elasticity of the 
demand for imports is usually lower, 
since imported products normally repre-
sent a high proportion of the total 
consumption, or such goods simply may 
not be produced in the country at all. 
The exports of these countries, for their 
part, are highly concentrated in just a 
few goods, almost the entire production 
of which is sold abroad. Consequently, 
on both the export and the import side, 
the change in the relative prices between 
products traded with the exterior and 
products used inside the country must 
be large in order to bring about an 
adjustment of a given size. Thus, the 
probability of large fluctuations in the 
exchange rate is greater, since it is more 
difficult to compensate the incentives 
for capital movements through variations 
in interest rates. 
Furthermore, the developing coun-
tries do not have substantial foreign 
exchange markets, and in most of them 
there are no future markets for their 
currencies, so that it is not possible for 
exporters and importers to cover them-
selves against foreign exchange risks in 
the domestic markets. 
Moreover, in most of the developing 
countries revenue from taxes on export 
and import activities forms an appre-
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ciable part of fiscal income, so that 
changes in exchange rates are also 
transmitted to the rest of the economy 
through their repercussions on fiscal 
financing. 
To sum up, then, while currency 
floating is a suitable possibility for the 
United States and Europe it is the least 
attractive or most costly option for most 
The effect of floating on 
As we have seen, the developing 
countries have generally been impelled 
to link their currencies to those of some 
industrial country with whom they 
trade. If there is a fluctuation in the 
mutual relationships of these currencies, 
then there will be changes in the 
effective exchange rate of the developing 
country in the same direction as the 
movement in the main currency. It is to 
be expected that .the movements of the 
main currency will have a balancing 
effect for the country issuing that 
currency, but they will not necessarily 
have such an effect from*the point of 
view of the developing country. 
In practice, the exchange rate varia-
tions required in order to achieve a 
balancing influence on the balance of 
payments of a developing country are 
generally different from those which 
would make possible a correction of the 
international payments of the industrial 
country to whose currency the deve-
loping country's currency has been 
linked. This unbalancing bias does not 
disappear even when the currency of the 
developing country is linked to a group 
of currencies of industrial countries, 
since what interests every importer, and 
exporter is the exchange rate of the 
of the developing countries. This is why 
the developing countries have not 
welcomed with any degree of enthusiasm 
the breakdown of the Bretton Woods 
agreement, and why in general they have 
linked their currencies with those of 
some industrial country with which they 
have substantial trade and financial links. 
the developing countries 
currency in which a transaction is being 
carried out, and not an average. The 
elimination of this problem involves 
relatively frequent adjustments to the 
exchange rate of the developing country 
with respect to the main currency. While 
such changes are made in some coun-
tries,12 they are only possible in an 
inflationary environment in which 
advantage can be taken of the exchange 
rate movements made necessary by 
inflation in order to move the real 
ex change rate also in the d esired 
direction. In countries where the rate of 
inflation has been low for a long period 
and where there is a tradition of 
exchange rate stability, these frequent 
adjustments are often politically impos-
sible and may even be economically 
dangerous because of the expectations 
which they may generate. 
Floating therefore introduces an 
additional element of risk into the 
external trade transactions of the deve-
loping countries and consequently tends 
to reduce the volume of resources 
devoted to the production of internatio-
12
 Such as Brazil, Chile and Colombia, for 
example. 
5. 
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nally saleable goods, since uncertainty is to which their own currency is linked. 
an additional cost in international These changes cannot be made too 
transactions as compared with transac- frequently, however, since this would 
tions on the domestic market. increase the risks involved in interna-
Some countries have tried to tackle tional transactions instead of reducing 
these problems by changing the currency them. 
6. 
The role of private holdings of foreign currency in the 
generation and transmission of international imbalances 
While there is no clear proof of this, it 
might be expected that the floating of the 
main currencies would reduce the 
demand for reserves for the purpose of 
intervention by the authorities, as 
compared with the demand generated 
under a system of fixed parities. In this 
latter system, the private sector can 
minimize the balances which it maintains 
in foreign currencies, since it is possible 
to obtain such currencies at any moment 
from the monetary authorities. The 
latter bear the entire responsibility as 
regards intervention in thé markets, 
particularly when only a small fluctua-
tion is permissible around the established 
exchange rate. In a system of floating 
exchange rates, in constrast, the task of 
intervening in the market falls entirely or 
partially on the private sector. When a 
perfectly clean float is involved, i.e., 
when the official sector never intervenes 
in the market, the responsibility of the 
private sector is complete, whereas when 
the monetary authority aims to regulate 
exchange rate fluctuations in some 
manner through its own intervention the 
responsibility of the private sector is 
partial. 
At all events, whether the monetary 
authorities do not intervene at all or 
intervene partially in the market, 
floating creates a stimulus for private 
intervention in the exchange markets 
with a view to reducing variations in 
exchange rates or else spreading them 
over a period of time. 
The private sector must accumulate 
stocks of the foreign exchange in which 
it is to intervene in order to play a part 
in the markets and thus try to reduce 
uncertainty about the exchange rates. 
Naturally, the bigger this accumulation of 
foreign exchange, the bigger will be the 
effect which the action of the private 
sector can have on the exchange 
markets, since when it has its own 
resources this sector is less vulnerable to 
control or regulatory measures that may 
be adopted by the authorities. 
Consequently, it may be expected as 
a result of floating that there will be a 
reduction in the official demand for 
reserves and an increase in the private 
demand for these. 
On the other hand, the greater the 
diversity of currencies which are of 
importance in the international market, 
the greater must be the diversity of the 
reserve holdings, both official and 
private, if there are changes in the 
exchange rates of these currencies. Such 
diversification may tend to make 
exchange rates more volatile by creating 
opportunities for speculative movements 
among the various currencies accepted in 
international payments. This is particu-
larly so when a considerable part of the 
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accumulation of reserve currencies is 
concentrated in the private sector, since 
the official sector may be expected to be 
less sensitive to the possibility of 
speculative gains. 
For the private sector this generates 
a problem of the composition of assets, 
which may be dealt with through the 
well-known models of the composition 
of these. If we follow the logic of these 
models, we may conclude that when the 
private sector accumulates foreign 
currency it does so by disposing of other 
forms of assets, including national 
currency. Thus, the private accumulation 
of foreign currency may generate pres-
sures similar to those produced when the 
accumulation takes place in the official 
sector. Whereas in the latter case there 
would be an issue of money for the 
purchase of foreign currency, in the 
former case there would be a reduction 
in the demand for other assets, including 
money, matching the total demand for 
foreign currency. 
Let us suppose, for example, that 
starting from a situation of equilibrium 
there is a deficit in the United States 
balance of payments, measured in terms 
of liquidity, although the equilibrium of 
the balance is maintained when 
measured in terms of official transac-
tions.13 This equilibrium will be 
maintained as long as there is no official 
intervention, but the absence of interven-
13
 This means that although the situation 
as regards the official external assets and 
liabilities of the United States does not change, 
the net liabilities to private creditors increase. 
tion will not guarantee equilibrium in 
the balance of payments measured in 
terms of liquidity. 
In the example described, additional 
balances of dollars in the hands of the 
private sector would be building up 
abroad, thus generating inflationary 
pressures towards the exterior. Through 
this mechanism, the disequilibrium in 
the United States balance of payments 
would be transmitted to the rest of the 
world, even if the exchange rates were 
floating. 
Naturally, the process of transmis-
sion also functions through the exchange 
rates. A devaluation will produce an 
increase in the cost of imported products 
and will also apply upward pressure to 
the domestic prices of exported goods, 
thus causing an increase in the average 
domestic prices, whereas revaluation will 
not produce a similar reduction in these 
prices, because prices do not go down as 
easily as they go up. It will thus be 
observed that the system of exchange 
rate floating contains an inflationary 
element even when, over a long period of 
time, the average exchange rate remains 
constant. There are those who assert that 
this bias towards inflation is increased by 
the fact that exchange rate floating 
conceals behind the movements of the 
exchange rate the unbalancing effects of 
domestic policies, so that it reduces the 
incentive to apply anti-inflationary 
policies. 
To sum up, there are various ways in 
which an imbalance can be transmitted 
internationally, even with completely 
floating exchange rates. 
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7. 
The reform of the system 
The breakdown of the international 
monetary system in 1971 immediately 
generated greater interest in the discus-
sions about its reform. Although some 
economists had long ago drawn attention 
to the need to make changes in the 
system, these proposals had taken shape 
only in the creation of Special Drawing 
Rights. The rest of the features of the 
system had remained completely 
untouched until their complete break-
down. 
The existing institutional machinery 
did not facilitate the study of a broad 
type of monetary reform in which the 
participants would be not only the most 
important industrial countries, but also 
the rest of the members of IMF, 
including the developing countries. The 
Board of Governors of the Fund, its 
highest authority, was not a suitable 
mechanism for the study and discussion 
of such a complex problem, as it was 
difficult both to arrange for relatively 
frequent meetings of over 120 Governors 
and to organize a fruitful discussion in 
such a large assembly. In view of this, 
the Executive Directors of the IMF 
proposed to the Board of Governors the 
establishment of a committee of 20 
Governors representing the various coun-
tries or geographical areas of the world: 
with a small Executive Secretariat and 
through frequent technical-level 
meetings this could take upon itself the 
study of monetary reform. This 
Committee, which was set up with the 
name of the Committee of 20, worked in 
1972 and 1973 to prepare the bases for 
the future monetary reform. 
The Committee of 20 tried to 
conceive the basic characteristics of a 
monetary system of the future which 
could solve in a suitable manner both the 
problems of adjusting the balance of 
payments and those of creating liquidity. 
The Committee agreed on the need to 
ensure greater similarity between the 
adjustment obligation of countries which 
had deficits and those which had 
surpluses and on the desirability of 
ensuring better control of the creation of 
liquidity. There was general agreement 
that the Special Drawing Rights should 
be the centre of the monetary system, 
thus replacing gold, and that it was 
desirable to set up a system of stable but 
adjustable parities. 
The Committee of 20 was subse-
quently replaced by what was known as 
the Interim Committee,14 which was the 
forerunner of another committee later 
set up as a permanent organ of IMF 
through an amendment to its Articles. 
This Interim Committee ratified the 
basic characteristics of the system as 
agreed in the Committee of 20, although 
it changed the approach of its work 
somewhat. It devoted itself essentially to 
determining what amendments should be 
made immediately to the Articles of 
Agreement of the Fund with a view to 
establishing some legal basis for the 
functioning of the international mone-
tary system. At the Fifth Meeting of the 
Interim Committee of the Board of 
14The Committee of 20 submitted its final 
report, with an outline of the reforms needed, 
on 14 June 1974. It was replaced on 2 October 
of the same year by the new Interim 
Committee of the Board of Governors of the 
International Monetary Fund. 
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Governors of IMF on the international 
monetary system, held in Jamaica in 
January 1976, it gave its final backing to 
a set of new measures which substan-
tially modified the Articles of Agree-
ment of the Fund.15 
8. 
The developing countries, the amendments to the 
Articles of Agreement of the IMF, and the 
agreements of the Jamaica Meeting 16 
The amendments to the Articles of 
Agreement of IMF approved at the 
Jamaica Meeting refer to five basic 
aspects of the monetary system: the 
function of gold, the exchange system, 
Special Drawing Rights, the operations 
and transactions of the Fund, and its 
institutional structure. 
(a) Gold in the reformed monetary 
system 
The new measures mean the aboli-
tion of the official price of gold and of 
the set of rules designed to enforce that 
official price, including the end of the 
limitations of central banks or monetary 
authorities on free operations in the gold 
market. Without an official price, gold 
ceases to be the centre of the monetary 
system, since these measures eliminate 
all predetermined links between gold and 
currencies. Gold thus comes to play, 
within the monetary system, the same 
role as any other non-perishable product, 
the only difference being that this metal 
has a very generalized acceptance. 
Generally speaking, the Fund is 
authorized to sell gold at a price linked 
to the market price in exchange for 
currencies, subject to certain limitations 
and after consultation with the country 
whose currency is being acquired in 
exchange for gold. The Fund is also 
authorized to sell gold to the countries 
which were members on 31 August 
1975, in proportion to their membership 
quotas at that date, in exchange for their 
own currencies and at the official price. 
Every time that the Fund sells gold 
at the market price it must pay into its 
General Account the proportion corres-
ponding to the official price, while the 
surplus must be paid into a Special 
Disbursement Account serving to pay 
both for ordinary operations and for 
financing special operations not consi-
dered in the Articles of Agreement, 
including possible direct distribution of 
the money to the developing countries in 
proportion to their quotas. When special 
operations are involved, these must be 
approved by the Board of Governors 
with a majority of 85 per cent of the 
voting power. 
By eliminating the official price of 
gold, the system of parities based on gold 
disappears not only defacto but also 
5s In April 1976 the Board of Governors 
ratified what had been approved by the Interim 
Committee at the Jamaica Meeting. In order for 
the amendments to the Articles of Agreement 
to come into force, however, ratification by the 
legislature is needed in most of the Fund's 
member countries. 
16
 A similar analysis of the subject dealt 
with in this section, made by the same author, 
previously appeared in Temas del nuevo orden 
económico internacional, Cuadernos de la 
CEPAL, N° 11, Santiago, Chile, 1976. 
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de jure so that the need arises for a new 
exchange system. 
(b) The exchange system 
The changes in the exchange system 
provide that every country can use the 
system of its choice: floating, frequent 
gradual adjustments, joint floats with 
other currencies, fixed exchange rates 
with respect to the intervention 
currency, Special Drawing Rights or a 
group of various currencies, or such 
other systems as may be adopted by the 
central banks. It is specified, however, 
that whatever the system used, the Fund 
shall exercise general supervision of the 
functioning of the systems in use, in 
order to ensure the collaboration of their 
members with a view to solving any 
problems which may arise. 
In other words, the new articles of 
the Fund do not establish an exchange 
system but rather simply give their 
sanction to the existing situation,17 
although they do authorize the Fund to 
restore a system of parities whose basis is 
described only in general outline. Thus, 
the draft states that, with a majority of 
85 per cent of the voting power, the 
Fund can decide that the international 
economic conditions permit the intro-
duction of a general foreign exchange 
system based on "stable but adjustable" 
parities which may be established in 
terms of Special Drawing Rights or of 
some other common denominator which 
is neither gold nor national currencies. 
They also provide that the maximum 
17
 It is proposed to change the title of 
Article IV of the Articles of Agreement of the 
International Monetary Fund, "Par values of 
currencies", to "Obligations regarding exchange 
arrangements". 
and minimum exchange rates for spot 
transactions between the currency of 
one country and those of others which 
maintain this system of parities may not 
differ by more than 4 per cent, although 
this margin can be changed by the Fund 
subject to an 85 per cent majority vote. 
Since these parities are not expressed on 
the basis of currencies, the margin is 
applied in the same way to all of 
them.18 
In order to be able to restore the 
system of parities, in addition to the 85 
per cent voting majority required, the 
Fund must take account of the situation 
of the world economy, particularly as 
regards the generation of liquidity and 
the process of adjustment. As regards the 
former, it was hoped that there would be 
good control of the growth of interna-
tional liquidity, and as regards the latter 
it was hoped that arrangements would 
come into effect under which both 
members in surplus and members in 
deficit in their balances of payments 
would take "prompt, effective and 
symmetrical action" to achieve adjust-
ment. The Fund must also make its 
determination on the basis of the 
underlying stability of the world econo-
my, taking into account price move-
ments and rates of expansion in the 
economies of its member countries. 
(c) Special Drawing Rights 
The amendments connected with the 
characteristics and use of Special 
Drawing Rights are designed to make 
these the main reserve asset of the 
international monetary system. They put 
If the parities were expressed in terms of 
a currency, then the possible margin of 
variation of the latter would be half the margin 
of variation of the other currencies. 
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an end to the link between Special 
Drawing Rights and gold and authorize 
the Fund to determine the mode of 
valuing them and even make substantial 
changes in the systems of valuation. In 
general terms, they maintain the provi-
sions which limit the use of Special 
Drawing Rights to situations of need 
rather than cases where there is simply a 
desire to change the structure of a 
country's reserves. The principle of 
"designation" is preserved, whereby the 
Fund can designate a country to provide 
currency in exchange for Special Drawing 
Rights, provided that the country's 
reserve position is sufficiently strong. In 
addition, the majority needed for modi-
fying or eliminating the obligation to 
reconstitute funds is reduced.19 
The limitations on the rate of 
interest payable on Special Drawing 
Rights are eliminated, and gold is 
eliminated as a means of payment for 
obtaining Special Drawing Rights in 
order to pay the charges applied. The 
countries participating in the Special 
Drawing Account undertake to colla-
borate to ensure that SDRs are 
converted into the principal asset of the 
international monetary system. In addi-
tion it is laid down that countries may 
pay the Fund in currencies of other 
member countries in exchange for 
19
 The present provisions state that each 
participant shall so use and reconstitute its 
holdings of Special Drawing Rights that at the 
end of each calendar quarter the average of its 
total daily holdings of Special Drawing Rights 
over the most recent five-year period shall be 
not less than 30 per cent of the average of its 
daily net cumulative allocation of Special 
Drawing Rights over the same period. If the 
average is below the minimum, the participant 
is obliged to "reconstitute" its holdings, i.e., to 
acquire Special Drawing Rights in order to 
comply with this obligation. 
Special Drawing Rights, provided that 
the countries issuing the currency in 
question are agreeable to the transaction. 
(d) The operations of the Fund and its 
institutional structure 
The new articles also provide for 
modernization of the operations and 
transactions of the Fund and expansion 
of the categories covered by them 
and facilitate the use of the Fund's 
resources to finance contributions to 
international buffer stocks of primary 
commodities; in addition, it is hoped 
that the IMF will use its holdings of all 
currencies in its operations, and not just 
its holdings of some of them, as occurs 
at present: the concept of "currency 
convertible in fact" is replaced by that 
of "freely usable currency". 
As regards the institutional structure 
of the Fund, the new articles authorize 
the Board of Governors of the Fund to 
set up, as a new IMF body, a Council of 
Governors to serve as an organ of 
analysis and discussion of a political 
nature which will be more flexible and 
efficient than the Board itself. The 
Council will have as many members as 
there are Executive Directors of the 
Fund, and these members will be elected 
by the same countries or groups of 
countries which elect the Executive 
Directors. 
(e) Other decisions of the Interim 
Committee 
In addition to approving the amend-
ments to the Articles of Agreement of 
the IMF, the Jamaica meeting of the 
Interim Committee ratified the decision 
to sell one-sixth (some 25 million 
ounces) of the Fund's gold holdings by 
public auction over a period of four 
years and to devote all the profits thus 
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produced to the developing countries 
both by directly supplying them with a 
proportion of the profits corresponding 
to their quotas and through the forma-
tion of a special aid fund for developing 
countries which are going through 
difficult conditions. In the latter case, 
the per capita income of the member 
country in question will be taken into 
account.20 
The meeting also ratified the deci-
sion to provide each member country, in 
exchange for payment in its own 
currency, with a proportion corres-
ponding to that country's quota of an 
additional amount of 25 million ounces 
of gold, valued at the official price of 
0.888671 grams of fine gold per SDR 
unit. 
At the Jamaica meeting, the Interim 
Committee endorsed the IMF Executive 
Directors' proposals for a global increase 
of 32.5 per cent in the quotas of 
member countries.21 This increase 
would be so distributed that it would 
double the proportion of quotas 
accounted for by the oil-exporting 
countries (from 5 per cent to 10 per cent 
of the total), the proportion of the other 
developing countries would remain the 
same, while that of the industrial 
countries would be reduced. At the same 
time, the Committee decided to support 
the proposal for a 45 per cent increase in 
each of the credit tranches of the Fund 
2 0
 This means that special preference will 
be given to countries with a per capita income 
of less than 300 SDR units (some 360 dollars), 
thus ruling out most of Latin America. 
21
 The increase in the quotas has already 
been approved by a vote of the Governors, but 
it will not enter into force until the legal 
requirements are completed in each country 
and until the reforms to the Articles of 
Agreement of the Monetary Fund are approved. 
The whole process may last for another year or 
more. 
as a temporary measure until the 
increase in the quotas came into effect. 
In addition, the Committee noted 
with satisfaction the decision of the 
Executive Directors of the Fund to 
modify the arrangements for compensa-
tory financing to make up for temporary 
shortfalls in export incomes. These 
modifications will liberalize the system 
and enable more account to be taken of 
the most recent developments, including 
the price increases recorded in interna-
tional trade. 
(f) Effects on the developing countries 
Out of this set of decisions, the most 
noteworthy because of their effect on 
the developing countries in general and 
the Latin American countries in parti-
cular are those connected with the 
abolition of the official price of gold, the 
use of all currencies in operations and 
transactions, the acceptance of the 
existence of multiple foreign exchange 
systems, the changes made in the 
compensatory financing facility, the 
temporary increase in the credit tranches 
of the Fund, and the establishment of a 
Trust Fund.22 
First of all, the abolition of the 
official price of gold means in practice 
- a s long as its general acceptance lasts-
an increase in that price. Market prices 
already influenced the decisions of the 
central banks in the past, but the 
freedom to carry out gold transactions at 
market prices gives official sanction to 
the consideration of gold at higher prices 
than the official rate of 1 SDR unit per 
0.888671 grams of fine gold (equivalent 
22
 The Trust Fund will be set up with part 
of the profits from the sale of the Fund's gold 
and will be designed to help the poorest 
member countries on highly concessional terms. 
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to about 42 dollars per ounce). In 
reality, the Fund had already agreed 
with at least one member country that 
the member could value its gold reserves, 
for domestic purposes, at a higher price 
than the official figure. 
A higher price for gold means an 
increase in liquidity as expressed in 
terms of currency, in proportion to 
countries* gold holdings. Since there is 
uncertainty about the market price, 
however, it is probable that in measuring 
the liquidity created it will be necessary 
to reduce the apparent result by a 
certain amount in order to take this 
uncertainty into account. 
If a difference in price of 60 dollars 
per ounce is assumed between the 
official price and the market price, the 
legitimation of the latter price for 
official operations will, if the proposed 
amendments to the Articles of Agree-
ment are approved, affect the conduct of 
official holders of gold. If, in view of the 
uncertainty about the market price, the 
profit margin influencing the decisions 
of these official holders of gold is 
reduced to a figure of 50 dollars, the 
resultant increase in liquidity would be 
some 50 billion dollars. Out of this total, 
no more than 2.6 billion dollars would 
correspond to the non-oil-exporting 
developing countries.23 
Moreover, the provisions concerning 
the Fund's use of all currencies in its 
operations mean that use will also be 
made of the currencies of the developing 
23
 These estimates are based on the 
assumption that the total gold holdings of the 
member countries of IMF are 1 billion ounces, 
of which 5 per cent corresponds to holdings of 
the non-oil-exporting countries. It is assumed 
that the price of gold which influences the 
decisions of holders of this metal is below the 
market price, since the latter is subject to quite 
substantial fluctuations. 
countries, which are not generally 
considered reserve currencies and will 
therefore be converted into such curren-
cies. The reserves of the developing 
countries would thus be committed to 
some extent, although exactly how 
much is difficult to specify.24 
The new agreements would probably 
also have other longer term but perhaps 
more important effects on the deve-
loping countries. The endorsement of 
floating as a system might oblige 
countries to diversify their reserve 
currency holdings, thus reducing instead 
of increasing the importance of Special 
Drawing Rights. For the developing 
countries, whose currencies will not 
generally be accumulated by other 
countries, these holdings could signify an 
extra cost in terms of resources delivered 
in exchange for the currencies of the 
other countries which are being accumu-
lated. This cost is also difficult to 
estimate in advance, and its measure-
ment will have to await the course of 
events. 
Moreover, as already noted, floating 
does in itself impose an additional cost 
on most of the developing countries 
which, because of the lack of exchange 
markets for transactions in their curren-
cies or because of the small size of such 
markets, are obliged to link their 
currencies to those of some other 
country or group of countries with 
which they trade. Naturally, if floating 
manages to minimize the fluctuations in 
the international trade of the developed 
countries it will in this way have a 
positive effect on the developing 
If a country, in drawing on the Fund, 
obtains currencies which are little used in 
international trade, it can approach the country 
issuing that currency to obtain reserve curren-
cies in exchange for it. 
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countries, but what has been observed 
so far does not seem to point in this 
direction. 
The changes made in the compensa-
tory financing facility enable the deve-
loping countries to use it more easily,2S 
and the estimates made by IMF seem to 
indicate that these countries would be 
able to draw on about 1 billion dollars in 
this way in 1976.26 Assuming net 
increases of 1 billion dollars per year 
until the figure of an additional 5 billion 
dollars is reached, the current value of 
this greater access to credit, calculated at 
an actualization rate of 7 per cent per 
year, would be less than 4.4 billion 
dollars. 
The temporary 45 per cent increase 
in the credit tranches of the Fund also 
represents an increase in the resources at 
the disposal of all member countries: in 
this way, the developing countries could 
obtain some 500 million dollars in 
1976.27 If it is assumed that these 
countries will be able to count on net 
increases of 500 million dollars per year 
under this heading until the figure of 2 
billion dollars is reached, then the 
present value of such resources, also at 
an actualization rate of 7 per cent 
per year would be some 1.8 million 
dollars. 
Finally, the Trust Fund could mean 
an additional contribution in favour of 
25
 It is not yet possible to measure the 
greater ease of use of the compensatory 
financing facility in concrete terms, since this 
will depend not only on the new operating 
rules, but also on the specific policies which the 
Fund puts into practice. 
26
 Statement by the Managing Director of 
IMF at press conference held on 8 January 
1976, IMF Survey, 19 January 1976, pp.24 
and 25. 
21
 Ibid., pp. 24 and 25. 
the poorest developing countries of 400 
to 500 million dollars. 
The liberalization of the compensa-
tory financing facility and the temporary 
increase in the credit tranches would 
thus mean some 5.2 million dollars more 
for the non-oil-ex porting developing 
countries, measured in terms of the 
present value of the sums involved. The 
freeing of the price of gold and the 
establishment of the Trust Fund would 
represent about an extra 3 billion 
dollars. 
At the same time, however, the 
termination of the Oil Facility would 
mean the loss of rights to draw resources 
amounting to some 2.8 billion dollars, 
which is the present value of the 
drawings by developing countries made 
or approved in 1974, 1975 and 1976.28 
The developing countries are also 
affected by the greater need to adjust 
their economies to cope with the 
fluctuations of the main currencies and 
the need to accumulate additional 
currencies in their reserves. For the 
developed countries, in contrast, floating 
seems to solve some problems of capital 
movements which would be difficult to 
handle by other means, while the 
accumulation of currencies by these 
countries is compensated because each 
of them accumulates the currencies of 
the others. Thus, in net terms, the 
accumulation of currencies by the 
developing countries signifies the absorp-
tion by them of currencies issued by the 
developed countries. 
Moreover, the developed countries 
and the oil-exporting countries will 
2 8
 The Oil Facility was set up by the Fund 
in 1974 with the aim of helping to avoid 
restrictive measures on international trade 
which might arise in oil-importing countries as a 
result of the sharp rise in the price of this fuel. 
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MEASURABLE EFFECTS OF THE REFORM OF THE MONETARY SYSTEM AND 
OTHER AGREEMENTS BY THE FUND ON THE DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES AND OTHER MEMBER COUNTRIES OF IMF 
(Billions of dollars) 
Non-oil-exporting 
developing countries Other IMF members 
Compensatory financing 4 387a — 
Credit Tranches 1 812b 5 616c 
Goldd 3 000 48 000 
Oile - 2 757 + 2 757 
TOTAL 6 442 56 373 
aCalculated on the assumption that only the non-oil-exporting developing countries make use 
of this facility. The calculations also assume that there will be a net increase in drawings of 1 
billion dollars per year for five years and that from then on there will be no net increases. In order 
to work out the present value, an actualization rate of 7 per cent per year was used. 
"Calculated on the assumption that there will be a net increase in drawings by the developing 
countries of 500 million dollars per year until a total of 2 billion dollars is reached. 
cCaIculated on the assumption that there will be a net increase in the drawings by the other 
member countries of 2 billion dollars per year until a total of 6 billion dollars is reached. 
°Calculated on the assumption of a gain of 50 dollars per ounce in the price of gold kept as 
reserves. 
eThe effective data were actualized at the rate of 7 per cent per year. 
receive an increase in their liquidity, dollars. Their total benefits thus rise to 
measured in terms of currency, of some
 s o m e 56.4 billion dollars. 
48 billion dollars, while they will also 
have the possibility of using the As may be seen from the following 
expanded credit tranches of the Fund, table, the quantifiable effects of the 
which may signify a current value of Jamaica agreements and the other 
some 5.6 billion dollars more, thus measures adopted by the Fund represent 
making a total of about 53.6 billion resources worth almost 64 billion 
dollars. Furthermore, these countries dollars, of which only 10 per cent 
will no longer have to contribute to the corresponds to the non-oil-exporting 
financing of the Oil Facility, which developing countries, although these 
involved (after deduction of the countries contribute 22 per cent of the 
drawings made by developed countries) quotas of the Fund and generate at least 
the provision by them of financing with 15 per cent of the total national product 
a current value of some 2.8 billion of the Fund members. 
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The effects of the present situation on the 
future system 
The objective which should be achieved 
by a new international monetary system 
and which had been endorsed at various 
ministerial-level international meetings 
are those of reducing the role of gold in 
the system, making Special Drawing 
Rights the central element, achieving 
suitable control of the expansion of 
liquidity, and ensuring symmetrical incen-
tives for adjustments by both deficit and 
surplus countries. Another objective 
which has been mentioned is that of 
achieving a system of stable but 
adjustable parities: more stable than the 
present exchange rates, but also more 
easily adjustable than the old parities. 
The strategy selected for achieving these 
objectives is that of gradual evolution in 
order thus to ensure that every further 
step is taken only when the general 
economic circumstances make this 
possible. 
Today, however, the situation of the 
system seems to be pointing, as we shall 
see, in a different direction from that 
indicated. At present, a group of 
industrial countries has agreed on a joint 
float of their currencies, while those of 
other industrial countries float indepen-
dently and the vast majority of the 
developing countries have linked their 
currencies to those of one or other of 
the industrial countries. 
The joint floating of a group of 
currencies calls for official intervention 
in order to maintain each of them within 
the limits which have been accepted by 
the group. This intervention calls for the 
constant use of the various currencies 
which make up the group and for 
financing which is generally obtained 
through some form of mutual credit 
support between the central banks. 
While the financing needs would be very 
small or zero in the long term if the 
system were stable, this stability is 
nevertheless not guaranteed, and at the 
same time there is a short-term need for 
financial resources in order to intervene. 
Naturally, this intervention is carried out 
with the use of currencies, and not of 
other international assets. 
Moreover, the group of currencies 
which float together moves, with respect 
to the currencies which are floating 
independently, in a direction which is 
generally balanced for the group of 
countries involved, although not neces-
sarily for each individual country. If this 
is a free or "clean" float, the authorities 
do not need to intervene in the markets. 
From this point of view, while the 
authorities need to possess resources in 
order to intervene in order to maintain 
the exchange rates within the limits 
agreed by the group of countries whose 
currencies are floating together, they do 
not need to intervene in respect of any 
currencies outside the group. In this 
case, however, as already stated, there 
will be incentives for the private sector 
to intervene in the markets of the 
currencies which are floating, and this 
sector will consequently have to accumu-
late currencies with which to intervene. 
The developing countries, for their 
part, which are generally forced to link 
their currencies to those of some 
industrial countries, have to accept 
unlimited intervention by their central 
banks in order to maintain the exchange 
rate fixed in respect of the currency to 
THE REVOLT OF THE BANKERS IN THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY / Carlos Massad 115 
which they are linked. Since this link can 
produce destabilizing effects it may also 
increase the need for official reserves in 
order to intervene. Thus, considerations 
of uncertainty will assuredly lead the 
central banks of the developing 
countries, like other holders of foreign 
currencies, to diversify their holdings. 
This situation has various effects on 
the demand for reserves. As already 
stated, the monetary authorities of the 
countries whose currencies are floating 
together cover their requirements for the 
intervention financing needed to main-
tain the exchange rates prevailing 
between them through a system of 
mutual credits, so that the net demand 
for additional reserves by the group for 
this purpose will be close to zero. 
Moreover, the floating with respect to 
the other main currencies will tend to 
diminish their demand for reserves and 
to change the composition of such 
reserves in favour of a larger accumula-
tion of the currencies of the countries 
outside the group which are accepted as 
an international means of payment. The 
private sector, for its part, will display a 
bigger demand for currency with which 
to carry out the sector's expanded 
intervention in the currency markets. 
It is difficult to gauge the relative 
effect of these influences in view of the 
limited number of observations available 
and the fact that the float has not been 
really clean. It is possible, however, to 
draw some tentative conclusions 
regarding the real transfers of resources 
implicit in the accumulation of reserves. 
The incentives which are inherent in the 
system seem to point towards a slight 
reduction in the official demand for 
reserves in those countries whose curren-
cies are floating, as against an increase 
—sometimes considerable- in private 
demand. At all events, the countries 
whose currencies are used in inter-
national transactions will observe that 
the increase in holdings of the currencies 
of other countries is compensated, at 
least partly, by the increase in holdings 
of their own currency by other 
countries. 
In the case of the countries whose 
currencies are floating jointly, it may be 
hoped that, if the system is stable, the 
purchases and sales of each particular 
currency will tend to cancel each other 
out in the long run. Consequently, for 
the countries whose currencies are used 
in international trade, any additional 
accumulation of reserves will take place 
without real transfers of resources or else 
with very small transfers. This contrasts 
with the situation before 1970, when the 
European group of countries accumula-
ted the dollar without the United States 
having to accumulate European curren-
cies. As a result of these influences, there 
will be a relative increase in the demand 
for currency compared with other 
reserve assets, and particularly compared 
with Special Drawing Rights. 
In the developing countries, the 
demand for official reserves will tend to 
increase because of the additional 
requirements for adjustment created by 
the linking of their currencies to another 
floating currency. This accumulation will 
take place without compensation, since 
the other countries will not accumulate 
the currencies of the developing 
countries.29 Consequently, these 
countries will accumulate reserves at the 
cost of transferring real resources to the 
countries whose currency they are 
accumulating. A link is thus established 
between the generation of liquidity and 
the transfer of real resources, but it is a 
link which operates in the opposite 
2 9
 Except for the currencies of the 
oU-exporting countries. 
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direction to that which is desired: 
resources are transferred from the 
developing countries to those whose 
currency is accumulated. 
This analysis enables us to conclude 
that the international monetary system 
does not help to strengthen the role of 
Special Drawing Rights. The require-
ments for reserves for the purpose of 
public or private intervention are 
concentrated essentially in the main 
currencies. If there is any increase in the 
demand for reserves, it will be an 
increase in the demand for currencies, 
and not for Special Drawing Rights. 
Although in the industrial countries 
there may be a reduction in the demand 
for reserves by the official sector, there 
can be no doubt that .there will be an 
increase in the demand by the private 
sector, which requires currency for its 
action and cannot, by the very nature 
and characteristics of these instruments, 
use Special Drawing Rights for this 
purpose. Thus, in these countries the 
main effect will probably be that of a 
change in the composition of the overall 
reserves, both public and private, in 
favour of currencies and to the prejudice 
of Special Drawing Rights. 
The same is not necessarily true of 
the developing countries, since the 
greater adjustment requirements created 
by the floating of the currencies to 
which the developing countries own 
currencies are linked will generate a bigger 
demand for official reserves. This 
bigger demand for reserves could also be 
reflected in an increase in the demand 
for Special Drawing Rights, but because 
of its small size this is not likely to 
increase the importance of the latter in 
the interna tional monetary system. 
Thus, the role of Special Drawing Rights 
in the system may well be reduced 
instead of increased, even if these are 
maintained as a useful unit of account. 
It should be stressed that the 
function of Special Drawing Rights as a 
unit of account, important though it 
may be, does not endow these instru-
ments with a central role in the system, 
since the same unit of account could be 
Constructed with a group of currencies, 
without any reference to Special 
Drawing Rights. 
The greater the importance of 
currencies as a reserve instrument, and 
the greater the proportion of private 
holdings in the total, the more difficult 
it will be to achieve suitable regulation 
of the growth of international reserves. 
On the one hand, the accumulation of 
currencies will depend on the economic 
policy of each country, and not on a 
rational collective decision, and on the 
other hand, the action of the private 
sector may help to create or destroy 
international means of payment through 
the operation of the banking systems, 
thus introducing into the picture an 
additional element which is extremely 
difficult to manage. 
In the Eurocurrency market, a 
banking multiplier is in operation which 
is similar to that which exists in any 
national banking system with fractional 
reserves.30 In national banking systems, 
the decisions of the private sector 
-banks, enterprises and individuals— as 
regards the reserves to be maintained to 
cope with possible withdrawals of 
deposits and as regards the preferred 
composition of currency holdings will 
determine the capacity of the banking 
system to create more or less money. 
The same elements operate in the 
For a detailed explanation of the process 
of "creation" of money in the Eurodollar 
market, see M. Friedman, "The Eurodollar 
market: Some first principles", in The Morgan 
Guaranty Survey, October 1969. 
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Eurocurrency market, with the diffe-
rence that generally there are no 
minimum legal cash requirements which 
tend to impose a relatively low limit on 
the banking multiplier. At all events, 
private decisions can reduce or increase 
the total volume of deposits of Euro-
currencies as well as cause changes in their 
composition, if private holdings grow 
sufficiently, then it will be the action of 
the private sector which predominates in 
matters of intervention, and there will be 
no guarantee whatever that this will take 
place with suitable attention to the 
international adjustment requirements. 
At the same time, the private sector 
can now evade the monetary and credit 
policies of the national central banks 
more easily than ever by the simple 
expedient of operating through banks 
located outside the national frontiers. 
The veritable revolution which has taken 
place as regards private international 
financing means that it is now much 
more difficult for the monetary autho-
rities of the countries to control the 
domestic monetary and credit situation. 
The private sector is therefore now at 
As will be gathered from the analysis 
made in the foregoing pages, the 
short-term situation is that the impor-
tance of Special Drawing Rights tends to 
go down, while that of currency floats 
tends to increase, as does the importance 
of certain individual currencies in inter-
national trade. At the same time, the 
authority of the body responsible for 
supervising the entire system diminishes, 
while the role of private decisions and 
the centre of the international monetary 
machinery. 
Generally speaking, then, the 
countries which are of greatest impor-
tance in international trade feel quite 
•comfortable about the floating of 
currencies, and their demand for Special 
Drawing Rights tends to go down, while 
the influence of the private sector tends 
to increase, thus solving the floating 
requirements. 
For the developing countries, in 
contrast, floating is a costly business, 
and in order to obtain additional 
liquidity resources they are obliged to 
transfer real resources in exchange. As 
these countries are not sufficiently 
important in quantitative terms in 
international transactions and their 
power of decision at the international 
level is rather limited, it is unlikely that 
their interests will predominate over 
those of the industrial countries, so that 
it can hardly be expected that the stated 
objectives of monetary reform will be 
fulfilled. Furthermore, the influence of 
private decisions on exchange and credit 
matters has come to be decisive. 
actions in the adjustment process is 
increased. 
In this latter aspect, the private 
banks and bankers which operate in the 
international financial field have ever-
increasing responsibilities. Their future 
expectations tend to make themselves 
come true, consequently provoking deva-
luations or revaluations if a devaluation 
or revaluation is what they expect. Thus, 
they have come to play a leading role in 
10. 
Conclusions 
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exchange fluctuations and in the inter-
national adjustment process. The private 
sector is more sensitive than the official 
sector to variations in relative interest 
rates or expected exchange rates, so that 
the extraordinary volume now assumed 
by private holdings of foreign currencies 
introduces a dangerous element of 
instability into the picture. In addition, 
the changes in the desired composition 
of the assets and liabilities of the private 
sector may lead to important effects on 
global internal demand. 
Because of this, the existing situa-
tion is not stable. It could lead to 
repeated crises and consequently bring 
about desirable modifications in the 
system, but such an effect would not be 
achieved through a peaceful evolution, 
but through the growing dissatisfaction 
caused by the crises. 
As an illustration of this, the case of 
"snake" is particularly interesting. 
Because of the conditions in which the 
world economy is evolving, the conti-
nued existence of the "snake" is only 
possible as a result of frequent adjust-
ments in the parities or central rates of 
the countries making up this system, or 
successive withdrawals and re-entries 
into the group, that is to say, frequent 
crises in the mechanism. 
It would seem that only repeated 
crises in the international financial field 
could finally bring about the achieve-
ment of the objectives considered 
desirable. The highest authorities of the 
member countries of IMF have agreed 
that it is necessary to have stable but 
adjustable exchange rates, and to reduce 
the importance of currencies while 
increasing that of Special Drawing Rights 
in international payments. The present 
situation, however, is leading in exactly 
the opposite direction. 
It is not even possible to achieve the 
objective of regulating the expansion of 
international liquidity in the present 
circumstances. The growing influence of 
private transactions in the international 
monetary markets31 makes it practically 
impossible to exercise adequate control 
over international liquidity, yet this is 
necessary in order to guarentee the 
sustained development of international 
trade without inflationary or depressive 
pressures. Such control calls for greater 
influence by the official sector and by 
the international organizations, including 
suitable regulation of the Eurocurrency 
markets. In this aspect also, however, the 
tendency has been in the opposite 
direction. 
In short, either the true objectives 
sought in the international financial field 
are not those which have so far been 
accepted internationally, or else the 
procedures adopted in order to try 
to achieve them are not the right ones. 
31
 In 1964, the private holdings of 
international liquidity, which amounted to 
some 24 billion dollars, were one-third of the 
total official reserves. By 1973, however, they 
amounted to some 125 billion dollars, that is to 
say, over two-thirds, and far exceeded the 
official reserves of the countries in whose 
currencies such holdings were maintained. See, 
for example, IMF, Annual Report, 1974, p. 44, 
which gives estimates of private holdings of 
international liquidity. 
